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In his great Riverside Church speech of April 1967, Martin Luther King, Jr., declared his reasons for opposing the Vietnam War. The war was, he said, a disaster for Black Americans, poisonous for the country, and above all a nightmare “for victims of our nation and for those it calls enemy.” Responding to moral demands that lie “beyond the calling of race or nation or creed,” King said that he had come to speak for these “enemies.” Speaking out was the “privilege and the burden of all of us who deem ourselves bound by allegiances and loyalties which are broader and deeper than nationalism and which go beyond our nation’s self-defined goals and positions.”

In her essay “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism”—which provoked the debate recorded in this book—Martha Nussbaum defends the moral position to which King gave such powerful expression. According to this cosmopolitan outlook, our highest allegiance must be to the community of humankind, and the first principles of our practical thought must respect the equal worth of all members of that community. Cosmopolitanism is a controversial view, one tendency of moral thought opposed
by other outlooks that resist its ideal of world citizenship in the name of sensibilities and attachments rooted in group affiliation or national tradition. The responses to Nussbaum’s essay reflect these conflicting pulls, highlighting at once the complexity of these issues and the importance of their resolution.

This book, then, presents competing philosophies—first principles connected to conduct through complex links of historical circumstance, social location, and individual judgment. But as King’s condemnation of the war demonstrates, those connections are no less real for being indirect. The disagreement about cosmopolitanism is practical as well as theoretical, with important implications for contemporary debate about protectionism, immigration, human rights, foreign intervention, development assistance, and what we should teach in our schools. In exploring the merits of cosmopolitanism as moral theory and personal conviction, Martha Nussbaum and her respondents join philosophical debate to public discussion, enriching each.

Nussbaum's lead essay first appeared in Boston Review (October/November 1994), along with twenty-nine replies. Eleven of those replies are included here, some substantially expanded, along with five additional contributions. The issues addressed—about the place of love of country in a morally decent life, and the tensions between local emotional attachments and cosmopolitan moral principles—took on new and compelling urgency after the horrible slaughter of innocents on September 11. Nussbaum’s response to those awful events, provided in a new introduction to the book, reminds us that moral thought is most important when the dangers we face are greatest.

Martha C. Nussbaum

Introduction:
Cosmopolitan Emotions?

In the aftermath of September 11, we have all experienced strong emotions for our country: fear, outrage, grief, astonishment. Our media portray the disaster as a tragedy that has happened to our nation, and that is how we very naturally see it. So too the ensuing war: it is called “America's New War,” and most news reports focus on the meaning of events for us and our nation. We think these events are important because they concern us. Not just human lives, but American lives. In one way, the crisis has expanded our imaginations. We find ourselves feeling sympathy for many people who did not even cross our minds before: New York firefighters, that gay rugby player who helped bring down the fourth plane, bereaved families of so many national and ethnic origins. We even sometimes notice with a new attention the lives of Arab-Americans among us, or feel a sympathy with a Sikh taxi driver who complains about customers who tell him to go home to “his country,” even though he came to the United States as a political refugee from persecution in the Punjab. Sometimes our compassion even crosses that biggest line of all, the national boundary. Events have led many Americans to sympathize with the
women and girls of Afghanistan, for example, in a way that many feminists had been trying to get people to do for a long time, without success.

All too often, however, our imaginations remain oriented to the local; indeed, this orientation is implicit in the unusual level of our alarm. The world has come to a stop—in a way that it never has for Americans, when disaster befalls human beings in other places. Floods, earthquakes, cyclones—and the daily deaths of thousands from preventable malnutrition and disease—none of these typically makes the American world come to a standstill, none elicits a tremendous outpouring of grief and compassion. The plight of innocent civilians in the current war evokes a similarly uneven and flickering response.

And worse: our sense that the “us” is all that matters can easily flip over into a demonizing of an imagined “them,” a group of outsiders who are imagined as enemies of the invulnerability and the pride of the all-important “us.” Compassion for our fellow Americans can all too easily slide over into an attitude that wants America to come out on top, defeating or subordinating other peoples or nations. Anger at the terrorists themselves is perfectly appropriate; so is the attempt to bring them to justice. But “us-them” thinking doesn’t always stay focused on the original issue; it too easily becomes a general call for American supremacy, the humiliation of “the other.”

One vivid example of this slide took place at a baseball game I went to at Chicago’s Comiskey Park, the first game played there after September 11—and a game against the Yankees, so there was a heightened awareness of the situation of New York and its people. Things began well, with a moving ceremony commemorating the firefighters who had lost their lives, and honoring local firefighters who had gone to New York afterward to help out. There was even a lot of cheering when the Yankees took the field, a highly unusual transcendence of local attachments. But as the game went on and the beer flowed, one heard, increasingly, the chant “U-S-A, U-S-A,” a chant left over from the Olympic hockey match in which the United States defeated Russia. This chant seemed to express a wish for America to defeat, abuse, humiliate its enemies. Indeed, it soon became a general way of expressing the desire to crush one’s enemies, whoever they were. When the umpire made a bad call that went against the White Sox, the same group in the stands turned to him, chanting “U-S-A.” In other words, anyone who crosses us is evil and should be crushed. It’s not surprising that Stoic philosopher and Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, trying to educate himself to have an equal respect for all human beings, reports that his first lesson was “not to be a fan of the Greens or Blues at the races, or the light-armed or heavy-armed gladiators at the Circus.”

Compassion is an emotion rooted, probably, in our biological heritage. (Although biologists once portrayed animal behavior as egocentric, primatologists by now recognize the existence of altruistic emotion in apes, and it may well exist in other species as well.) But this history does not mean that compassion is devoid of thought. In fact, as Aristotle argued long ago, human compassion requires three thoughts: that a serious bad thing has happened to someone else; that this bad event was not (or not entirely) the person’s own fault; and that we ourselves are vulnerable in similar ways. Thus compassion forms a psychological link between our own self-interest and the reality of another person’s good or ill. For that reason it is a morally valuable emotion—when it gets things right. Often, however, the thoughts involved in the emotion, and therefore the emotion itself, get astray, failing to link people at a distance to one’s own current possibilities and vulnerabilities. (Rousseau said that kings don’t feel compassion for their subjects because they count on never being human, subject to the vicissitudes of life.) Sometimes, too, compassion goes wrong by getting the seriousness of the bad event wrong; sometimes, for example, we just don’t take very seriously the hunger and illness of people who are distant from us. These errors are likely to be built into the nature of compassion.
as it develops in childhood and then adulthood: we form intense attachments to the local first, and only gradually learn to have compassion for people who are outside our own immediate circle. For many Americans, that expansion of moral concern stops at the national boundary.

Most of us are brought up to believe that all human beings have equal worth. At least the world's major religions and most secular philosophies tell us so. But our emotions don't believe it. We mourn for those we know, not for those we don't know. And most of us feel deep emotions about America, emotions we don't feel about India, or Russia, or Rwanda. In and of itself, this narrowness of our emotional lives is probably acceptable and maybe even good. We need to build outward from meanings we understand, or else our moral life would be empty of urgency. Aristotle long ago said, plausibly, that the citizens in Plato's ideal city, asked to care for all citizens equally, would actually care for none, since care is learned in small groups with their more intense attachments. If we want our life with others to contain strong passions—for justice in a world of injustice, for aid in a world where many go without what they need—we would do well to begin, at least, with our familiar strong emotions toward family, city, and country.

But concern should not stop with these local attachments. Americans are unfortunately prone to such emotional narrowness. So are all people, but the power and geographical size of America have long contributed to its particularly strong isolationist roots. When at least some others were finding ways to rescue the Jews during the Holocaust, America's inactivity and (general) lack of concern was culpable, especially in proportion to American power. It took Pearl Harbor to get us even to come to the aid of our allies. When genocide was afoot in Rwanda, our own sense of self-sufficiency and invulnerability stopped us from imagining the Rwandans as people who might be us; we were therefore culpably inactive toward them. So too in the present situation. Sometimes we see a very laudable recognition of the interconnectedness of all peoples, and of the fact that we must join forces with people in all nations to defeat terrorists and bring them to justice. At other times, however, we see simplifying slogans ("America Fights Back") that portray the situation in terms of a good "us" crusading against an evil "them"—failing to acknowledge, for example, that people in all nations have strong reasons to oppose terrorism, and that the fight has many active allies.

Such simplistic thinking is morally wrong, because it encourages us to ignore the impact of our actions on innocent civilians, and to focus too little on the all-important project of humanitarian relief. It is also counterproductive. We now understand, or ought to, that if we had thought more about support for the educational and humanitarian infrastructure of Pakistan, for example, funding good local nongovernmental organizations there the way several European nations typically do in India, young people of that nation might possibly have been educated in a climate of respect for religious pluralism, the equality of women, and other values that we rightly prize, instead of having fundamentalist madrasas as their only educational alternative. Our policy in South Asia has showed for many years a gross failure of imagination and sympathy; we basically thought in terms of cold war values, ignoring the real lives of people to whose prospects our actions could make a great difference. Such crude thinking is morally obtuse; it is also badly calculated to advance any good cause we wish to advance, in a world where all human lives are increasingly interdependent.

Compassion begins with the local. But if our moral natures and our emotional natures are to live in any sort of harmony we must find devices through which to extend our strong emotions and our ability to imagine the situation of others to the world of human life as a whole. Since compassion contains thought, it can be educated. We can take this disaster as occasion for narrowing our focus, distrusting the rest of the world, and feeling solidarity with Americans alone. Or we can take it as an occasion for expansion of our ethical
horizons. Seeing how vulnerable our great country is, we can learn something about the vulnerability all human beings share, about what it is like for distant others to lose those they love to a disaster not of their own making, whether it is hunger or flood or ethnic cleansing.

There are hopeful signs in the present situation, particularly in attempts to educate the American public about Islam, about the histories of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and about the situation and attitudes of Arab-Americans in this country. But we need to make these educational efforts consistent and systematic, not just fear-motivated responses to an immediate crisis.

Our media and our systems of education have long given us far too little information about lives outside our borders, stunting our moral imaginations. The situation of America’s women and its racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities has to some extent worked its way into curricula, at various levels, and into our popular media. We have done less well with parts of the world that are unfamiliar. This is not surprising, because such teaching requires a lot of investment in new curricular initiatives, and such television programming requires a certain temporary inattention to the competition for ratings. But we now know that we live in a complex, interconnected world, and we know our own ignorance. As Socrates said, this is at least the beginning of progress. At this time of national crisis we can renew our commitment to the equal worth of humanity, demanding media, and schools, that nourish and expand our imaginations by presenting non-American lives as deep, rich, and emotion-worthy. “Thus from our weakness,” said Rousseau of such an education, “our fragile happiness is born.” Or, at least, it might be born.
When anyone asked him where he came from, he said, “I am a citizen of the world.”

Diogenes Laerrius, Life of Diogenes the Cynic

In Rabindranath Tagore’s novel The Home and the World, the young wife Bimala, entranced by the patriotic rhetoric of her husband’s friend Sandip, becomes an eager devotee of the Swadeshi movement, which has organized a boycott of foreign goods. The slogan of the movement is Bande Mataram (Hail Motherland). Bimala complains that her husband, the cosmopolitan Hindu landlord Nikhil, is cool in his devotion to the cause:

And yet it was not that my husband refused to support Swadeshi, or was in any way against the Cause. Only he had not been able wholeheartedly to accept the spirit of Bande Mataram.

“I am willing,” he said, “to serve my country; but my worship I reserve for Right which is far greater than my country. To worship my country as a god is to bring a curse upon it.”

Americans have frequently supported the principle of Bande Mataram, giving the fact of being American a special salience in moral and political deliberation, and pride in a specifically American identity and a specifically American citizenship a special...
power among the motivations to political action. I believe, as do Tagore and his character Nikhil, that this emphasis on patriotic pride is both morally dangerous and, ultimately, subversive of some of the worthy goals patriotism sets out to serve—for example, the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of justice and equality. These goals, I shall argue, would be better served by an ideal that is in any case more adequate to our situation in the contemporary world, namely the very old ideal of the cosmopolitan, the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings.

My articulation of these issues is motivated, in part, by my experience working on international quality-of-life issues in an institute for development economics connected with the United Nations. It is also motivated by the renewal of appeals to the nation, and national pride, in some recent discussions of American character and American education. In a well-known op-ed piece in the *New York Times* (13 February 1994), philosopher Richard Rorty urges Americans, especially the American left, not to disdain patriotism as a value, and indeed to give central importance to “the emotion of national pride” and “a sense of shared national identity.” Rorty argues that we cannot even criticize ourselves well unless we also “rejoice” in our American identity and define ourselves fundamentally in terms of that identity. Rorty seems to hold that the primary alternative to a politics based on patriotism and national identity is what he calls a “politics of difference,” one based on internal divisions among America’s ethnic, racial, religious, and other subgroups. He nowhere considers the possibility of a more international basis for political emotion and concern.

This is no isolated case. Rorty’s piece responds to and defends Sheldon Hackney’s recent call for a “national conversation” to discuss American identity.1 As a participant in its early phase, I was made vividly aware that the project, as initially conceived,2 proposed an inward-looking task, bounded by the borders of the nation, rather than considering ties of obligation and commitment that join America to the rest of the world. As with Rorty’s piece, the primary contrast drawn in the project was between a politics based on ethnic and racial and religious difference and a politics based on a shared national identity. What we share as both rational and mutually dependent human beings was simply not on the agenda.

One might wonder, however, how far the politics of nationalism really is from the politics of difference. *The Home and the World* (better known, perhaps, in Satyajit Ray’s haunting film of the same title) is a tragic story of the defeat of a reasonable and principled cosmopolitanism by the forces of nationalism and ethnocentrism. I believe that Tagore sees deeply when he observes that, at bottom, nationalism and ethnocentric particularism are not alien to one another, but akin—that to give support to nationalistic sentiments subverts, ultimately, even the values that hold a nation together, because it substitutes a colorful idol for the substantive universal values of justice and right. Once someone has said, I am an Indian first, a citizen of the world second, once he or she has made that morally questionable move of self-definition by a morally irrelevant characteristic, then what, indeed, will stop that person from saying, as Tagore’s characters so quickly learn to say, I am a Hindu first and an Indian second, or I am an upper-caste landlord first, and a Hindu second? Only the cosmopolitan stance of the landlord Nikhil—so boringly flat in the eyes of his young wife Bimala and his passionate nationalist friend Sandip—has the promise of transcending these divisions, because only this stance asks us to give our first allegiance to what is morally good—and that which, being good, I can commend as such to all human beings.

Proponents of nationalism in politics and in education frequently make a weak concession to cosmopolitanism. They may argue, for example, that although nations should in general base education and political deliberation on shared national values, a
commitment to basic human rights should be part of any national education system, and that this commitment will in a sense hold many nations together. This seems to be a fair comment on practical reality; and the emphasis on human rights is certainly necessary for a world in which nations interact all the time on terms (let us hope) of justice and mutual respect.

But is it sufficient? As students here grow up, is it sufficient for them to learn that they are above all citizens of the United States but that they ought to respect the basic human rights of citizens of India, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Norway? Or should they—as I think—in addition to giving special attention to the history and current situation of their own nation, learn a good deal more than they frequently do about the rest of the world in which they live, about India and Bolivia and Nigeria and Norway and their histories, problems, and comparative successes? Should they learn only that citizens of India have equal basic human rights, or should they also learn about the problems of hunger and pollution in India, and the implications of these problems for the larger issues of global hunger and global ecology? Most important, should they be taught that they are, above all, citizens of the United States, or should they instead be taught that they are, above all, citizens of a world of human beings, and that, while they happen to be situated in the United States, they have to share this world with the citizens of other countries? I suggest four arguments for the second concept of education, which I call cosmopolitan education. But first I introduce a historical digression, which traces cosmopolitanism to its origins, and in the process recover some excellent arguments that have traditionally supported it.

II

When Diogenes the Cynic replied, “I am a citizen of the world,” he meant, apparently, that he refused to be defined by his local origins and group memberships, so central to the self-image of the conventional Greek male; instead, he defined himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics, who followed his lead, further developed his image of the kosmopolites (world citizen) arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities—the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that “is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun” (Seneca, De Otio). It is this community that is, fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations. With respect to the most basic moral values, such as justice, “We should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors” (Plutarch, On the Fortunes of Alexander). We should regard our deliberations as, first and foremost, deliberations about human problems of people in particular concrete situations, not problems growing out of a national identity that is altogether unlike that of others. Diogenes knew that the invitation to think as a world citizen was, in a sense, an invitation to be an exile from the comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiments, to see our own ways of life from the point of view of justice and the good. The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, his Stoic successors held, we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.

This clearly did not mean that the Stoics were proposing the abolition of local and national forms of political organization and the creation of a world state. Their point was even more radical: that we should give our first allegiance to no mere form of government, no temporal power, but to the moral community made up by the humanity of all human beings. The idea of the world citizen is in
The Stoics stress that to be a citizen of the world one does not need to give up local identifications, which can be a source of great richness in life. They suggest that we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then follows the extended family, then, in order, neighbors or local groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen—and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender, or sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest one, humanity as a whole. Our task as citizens of the world will be to "draw the circles somehow toward the center" (Stoic philosopher Hierocles, 1st-2nd ce), making all human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers, and so on. We need not give up our special affections and identifications, whether ethnic or gender-based or religious. We need not think of them as superficial, and we may think of our identity as constituted partly by them. We may and should devote special attention to them in education. But we should also work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our humanity special attention and respect.

In educational terms, this means that students in the United States, for example, may continue to regard themselves as defined partly by their particular loves—their families, their religious, ethnic, or racial communities, or even their country. But they must also, and centrally, learn to recognize humanity wherever they encounter it, undeterred by traits that are strange to them, and be eager to understand humanity in all its strange guises. They must learn enough about the different to recognize common aims, aspirations, and values, and enough about these common ends to see how variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and their histories. Stoic writers insist that the vivid imagining of the differ-
ent is an essential task of education, and that it requires, in turn, a mastery of many facts about the different. Marcus Aurelius gives himself the following advice, which might be called the basis for cosmopolitan education: “Accustom yourself not to be inattentive to what another person says, and as far as possible enter into that person's mind” (VI. 53). “Generally,” he adds, “one must first learn many things before one can judge another's action with understanding.”

A favored exercise in this process of world thinking is to conceive of the entire world of human beings as a single body, its many people as so many limbs. Referring to the fact that it takes only changing a single letter in Greek to convert the word “limb” (melos) into the word “part” (meros), Marcus says: “If, changing the word, you call yourself merely a [detached] part rather than a limb, you do not yet love your fellow men from the heart, nor derive complete joy from doing good; you will do it merely as a duty, not as doing good to yourself?” (VII. 13). It is important to recall that, as emperor, he gave himself that advice in connection with daily duties that required coming to grips with the cultures of remote and, initially, strange civilizations, such as Parthia and Sarmatia.

I would like to see education adopt this cosmopolitan Stoic stance. The organic model could, of course, be abused—if, for example, it was taken to deny the fundamental importance of the separateness of people and of fundamental personal liberties. Stoics were not always sufficiently attentive to these values and to their political salience; in that sense, their thought is not always a good basis for a scheme of democratic deliberation and education. But as the image is primarily intended—as a reminder of the interdependence of all human beings and communities—it has fundamental significance. There is clearly a huge amount to be said about how such ideas might be realized in curricula at many levels. Instead of beginning that more concrete task, however, I focus on the present day and offer four arguments for making world citizenship, rather than democratic or national citizenship, the focus for civic education.

III

1. Through cosmopolitan education, we learn more about ourselves.

One of the greatest barriers to rational deliberation in politics is the unexamined feeling that one's own preferences and ways are neutral and natural. An education that takes national boundaries as morally salient too often reinforces this kind of irrationality, by lending to what is an accident of history a false air of moral weight and glory. By looking at ourselves through the lens of the other, we come to see what in our practices is local and nonessential, what is more broadly or deeply shared. Our nation is appallingly ignorant of most of the rest of the world. I think this means that it is also, in many crucial ways, ignorant of itself.

To give just one example of this: If we want to understand our own history and our choices about child-rearing and the structure of the family, we are helped immeasurably by looking around the world to see in what configurations families exist, and through what strategies children are in fact being cared for. (This would include a study of the history of the family, both in our own and other traditions.) Such a study can show us, for example, that the two-parent nuclear family, in which the mother is the primary homemaker and the father the primary breadwinner, is by no means a pervasive style of child-rearing in today’s world. The extended family, clusters of families, the village, women’s associations—all these groups, and others, in various places in the world have major child-rearing responsibilities. Seeing this, we can begin to ask questions—for example, about how much child abuse there is in a family that involves grandparents and other relatives in child-rearing, as compared with the relatively isolated Western-
style nuclear family; or about how the different structures of child care support women’s work. If we do not undertake this kind of educational project, we risk assuming that the options familiar to us are the only ones there are, and that they are somehow “normal” and “natural” for all humans. Much the same can be said about conceptions of gender and sexuality, about conceptions of work and its division, about schemes of property holding, or about the treatment of children and the aged.

2. We make headway solving problems that require international cooperation.

The air does not obey national boundaries. This simple fact can be, for children, the beginning of the recognition that, like it or not, we live in a world in which the destinies of nations are closely intertwined with respect to basic goods and survival itself. The pollution of third-world nations that are attempting to attain our high standard of living will, in some cases, end up in our air. No matter what account of these matters we will finally adopt, any intelligent deliberation about ecology—as, also, about the food supply and population—requires global planning, global knowledge, and the recognition of a shared future.

To conduct this sort of global dialogue, we need knowledge not only of the geography and ecology of other nations—something that would already entail much revision in our curricula—but also a great deal about their people, so that in talking with them we may be capable of respecting their traditions and commitments. Cosmopolitan education would supply the background necessary for this type of deliberation.

3. We recognize moral obligations to the rest of the world that are real and that otherwise would go unrecognized.

What are Americans to make of the fact that the high living standard we enjoy is one that very likely cannot be universalized, at least given the present costs of pollution controls and the present economic situation of developing nations, without ecological disaster? If we take Kantian morality at all seriously, as we should, we need to educate our children to be troubled by this fact. Otherwise we are educating a nation of moral hypocrites who talk the language of universalizability but whose universe has a self-serving, narrow scope.

This point may appear to presuppose universalism, rather than being an argument in its favor. But here one may note that the values on which Americans may most justly pride themselves are, in a deep sense, Stoic values: respect for human dignity and the opportunity for each person to pursue happiness. If we really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights, we are morally required to think about what that conception requires us to do with and for the rest of the world.

Once again, that does not mean that one may not permissibly give one’s own sphere a special degree of concern. Politics, like child care, will be poorly done if each thinks herself equally responsible for all, rather than giving the immediate surroundings special attention and care. To give one’s own sphere special care is justifiable in universalist terms, and I think this is its most compelling justification. To take one example, we do not really think our own children are morally more important than other people’s children, even though almost all of us who have children would give our own children far more love and care than we give others. It is good for children, on the whole, that things work this way, and that is why our special care is good, rather than selfish. Education may and should reflect those special concerns—for example, in a given nation, spending more time on that nation’s history and politics.

But my argument does entail the idea that we should not confine our thinking to our own sphere; that in making choices in both political and economic matters we should most seriously consider the right of other human beings to life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness, and that we should work to acquire the knowledge that will enable us to deliberate well about those rights. I believe this sort of thinking will have large-scale economic and political consequences.

4. We make a consistent and coherent argument based on distinctions we are prepared to defend.

In Richard Rorty's and Sheldon Hackney's eloquent appeals to shared values, there is something that makes me very uneasy. They seem to argue effectively when they insist on the centrality to democratic deliberation of certain values that bind all citizens together. But why should these values, which instruct us to join hands across boundaries of ethnicity, class, gender, and race, lose steam when they get to the borders of the nation? By conceding that a morally arbitrary boundary such as the boundary of the nation has a deep and formative role in our deliberations, we seem to deprive ourselves of any principled way of persuading citizens they should in fact join hands across these other barriers.

For one thing, the very same groups exist both outside and inside. Why should we think of people from China as our fellows the minute they dwell in a certain place, namely the United States, but not when they dwell in a certain other place, namely China? What is it about the national boundary that magically converts people toward whom we are both incurious and indifferent into people to whom we have duties of mutual respect? I think, in short, that we undercut the very case for multicultural respect within a nation by failing to make central to education a broader world respect. Richard Rorty's patriotism may be a way of bringing all Americans together; but patriotism is very close to jingoism, and I'm afraid I don't see in Rorty's argument any proposal for coping with this very obvious danger.

Furthermore, the defense of shared national values in both Rorty and Hackney, as I understand it, requires appealing to certain basic features of human personhood that obviously also transcend national boundaries. So if we fail to educate children to cross those boundaries in their minds and imaginations, we are tacitly giving them the message that we don't really mean what we say. We say that respect should be accorded to humanity as such, but we really mean that Americans as such are worthy of special respect. And that, I think, is a story that Americans have told for far too long.

IV

Becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business. It is, as Diogenes said, a kind of exile—from the comfort of local truths, from the warm, nestling feeling of patriotism, from the absorbing drama of pride in oneself and one's own. In the writings of Marcus Aurelius (as in those of his American followers Emerson and Thoreau), a reader can sometimes sense a boundless loneliness, as if the removal of the props of habit and local boundaries had left life bereft of any warmth or security. If one begins life as a child who loves and trusts his or her parents, it is tempting to reconstruct citizenship along the same lines, finding in an idealized image of a nation a surrogate parent who will do one's thinking for one. Cosmopolitanism offers no such refuge; it offers only reason and the love of humanity, which may seem at times less colorful than other sources of belonging.

In Tagore's novel, the appeal to world citizenship fails. It fails because patriotism is full of color and intensity and passion, whereas cosmopolitanism seems to have a hard time gripping the imagination. And yet in its very failure, Tagore shows, it succeeds. For the novel is a story of education for world citizenship, since the entire tragic story is told by the widowed Bimala, who understands, if too late, that Nikhil's morality was vastly superior to Sandip's empty symbol-mongering, that what looked like passion in Sandip was egocentric self-exaltation, and that what looked like
lack of passion in Nikhil contained a truly loving perception of her as a person. If one goes today to Santiniketan, a town several hours by train from Calcutta where Tagore founded his cosmopolitan university, Vishvabharati (which means "all the world")—one feels the tragedy once more. For all-the-world university has not achieved the anticipated influence or distinction within India, and the ideals of the cosmopolitan community of Santiniketan are increasingly under siege from militant forces of ethnocentric particularism and Hindu-fundamentalist nationalism. And yet, in the very decline of Tagore's ideal, which now threatens the very existence of the secular and tolerant Indian state, the observer sees its worth. To worship one's country as if it were a god is indeed to bring a curse upon it. Recent electoral reactions against Hindu nationalism give some grounds for optimism that this recognition of worth is widespread and may prove efficacious, averting a tragic ending of the sort that Tagore describes.

And since I am in fact optimistic that Tagore's ideal can be successfully realized in schools and universities in democracies around the world, and in the formation of public policy, let me conclude with a story of cosmopolitanism that has a happy ending. It is told by Diogenes Laertius about the courtship and marriage of the Cynic cosmopolitan philosophers Crates and Hipparchia (one of the most eminent female philosophers of antiquity), in order, presumably, to show that casting off the symbols of status and nation can sometimes be a way to succeed in love. The background is that Hipparchia is from a good family, attached, as most Greek families were, to social status and pedigree. They resent the cosmopolitan philosopher Crates, with his strange ideas of world citizenship and his strange disdain for rank and boundaries.

[Hipparchia] fell in love with Crates' arguments and his way of life and paid no attention to any of her suitors nor to wealth or high birth or good looks. Crates, though, was everything to her. Moreover, she told her parents that she would kill herself if she were not married off to him. So Crates was called on by her parents to talk their daughter out of it; he did all he could, but in the end he didn't persuade her. So he stood up and threw off his clothes in front of her and said, "Here is your bridegroom; these are his possessions; make your decision accordingly—for you cannot be my companion unless you undertake the same way of life." The girl chose him. Adopting the same clothing and style of life she went around with her husband and they copulated in public and they went off together to dinner parties. And once she went to a dinner party at the house of Lysimachus and there refuted Theodorus the Atheist, with a sophism like this: "If it wouldn't be judged wrong for Theodorus to do something, then it wouldn't be judged wrong for Hipparchia to do it either; but Theodorus does no wrong if he beats himself; so Hipparchia too does no wrong if she beats Theodorus." And when Theodorus could not reply to her argument, he ripped off her cloak. But Hipparchia was not upset or distressed as a woman would normally be. (DL 6.96-8)

I am not exactly recommending Crates and Hipparchia as the marital ideal for students in my hypothetical cosmopolitan schools (or Theodorus the Atheist as their logic teacher). But the story does reveal this: that the life of the cosmopolitan, who puts right before country and universal reason before the symbols of national belonging, need not be boring, flat, or lacking in love.
As a visitor walks into Yad Vashem, the Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem, she comes upon a long avenue of trees. Each of these trees bears a number, a name or names, and a place. As of December 1995, there are, I believe, 1172 such trees. Each tree honors a person (or couple or family) who risked death to save a Jew or Jews. These people were goyim—French or Belgian or Polish or Scandinavian or Japanese or German, and atheist or Christian or members of some other religion. They had their own local identities and nationalities and, often, religions. They had friends and, in many cases, families. Sometimes some of these loyalties supported their actions; religion was frequently among their sources of support. Sometimes these loyalties opposed their choices—local politics always opposed them. These “righteous goyim,” however, risked the loss of all that was near and dear to them to save a stranger. They did not need to do so. Everything pointed the other way. But somehow, against all odds, their imaginations had acquired a certain capacity to recognize and
respond to the human, above and beyond the claims of nation, religion, and even family.

The sight of this avenue of trees can strike the visitor with a peculiarly stark terror, made all the more searing by the peaceful leafiness of the young trees, in such contrast to the monumental architecture that surrounds them. The terror, which persists, is the terror of the question they pose: Would one, in similar circumstances, have the moral courage to risk one's life to save a human being, simply because he or she is human? More generally, would one, in similar circumstances, have the moral courage to recognize humanity and respond to its claim, even if the powers that be denied its presence? That recognition, wherever it is made, is the basic act of world citizenship.

We have so many devious ways of refusing the claim of humanity. Rousseau speaks of the imagination's tendency to engage itself sympathetically only with those who resemble us, whose possibilities we see as real possibilities for ourselves. Kings don't pity subjects because they think they never will be subjects. But this is a fragile stratagem, both false and self-deceptive.1 We are all born naked and poor; we are all subject to disease and misery of all kinds; finally, we are all condemned to death. The sight of these common miseries can, therefore, carry our hearts to humanity—if we live in a society that encourages us to make the imaginative leap into the life of the other.

We also easily suppose, Rousseau adds, that people who are not like us do not really suffer as we suffer, do not really mind their pain. These obstacles in the mind were powerfully manipulated by Nazi antisemitism, which situated Jews at a distance from other citizens, constructed their possibilities as different from those of others, and encouraged citizens to imagine them as vermin or insects, who would really not suffer the way human beings suffer. And of course they let people know that to recognize human suffering would bring heavy penalties. Despite these obstacles, the people represented by the 1,172 trees recognized the human, and made this recognition the benchmark of their conduct.

My essay in defense of cosmopolitanism argues, in essence, that we should follow them and try as hard as we can to construct societies in which that norm will be realized in as many minds and hearts as possible and promoted by legal and institutional arrangements. Whatever else we are bound by and pursue, we should recognize, at whatever personal or social cost, that each human being is human and counts as the moral equal of every other. To use the words of John Rawls, “Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice.”

To count people as moral equals is to treat nationality, ethnicity, religion, class, race, and gender as “morally irrelevant”—as irrelevant to that equal standing. Of course, these factors properly enter into our deliberations in many contexts. But the accident of being born a Sri Lankan, or a Jew, or a female, or an African-American, or a poor person, is just that—an accident of birth. It is not and should not be taken to be a determinant of moral worth. Human personhood, by which I mean the possession of practical reason and other basic moral capacities, is the source of our moral worth, and this worth is equal. To recognize these facts is a powerful constraint on what one may choose and on the way in which one attempts to comport oneself as a citizen. What I am saying about education is that we should cultivate the factual and imaginative prerequisites for recognizing humanity in the stranger and the other. Rousseau is correct when he says that ignorance and distance cramp the consciousness. What I am saying about politics is that we should view the equal worth of all human beings as a regulative constraint on our political actions and aspirations.

What can this mean, when there is no world state? This question seems a little odd to me, given the fact that a very long tradition in concrete political thinking, beginning with
Cicero's *De Officiis* and extending through Grotius to Kant and Adam Smith and straight on to modern international law, has appealed to Stoic norms to justify certain maxims of both domestic and international political conduct. Some of these include: the renunciation of wars of aggression, constraints on the use of lies in wartime, an absolute ban on wars of extermination, and the humane treatment of prisoners and of the vanquished. In peacetime, both Cicero and Kant recognize duties of hospitality to aliens working on their soil; Kant insists on a strict denunciation of all projects of colonial conquest. For the entire tradition, individuals bore duties of benevolence that were loosely defined, in most cases, but understood to be extremely important and relatively demanding. Giving one's money is a major way in which, in the absence of a world state, individuals can promote the good of those who are distant from them. To say "I cannot act as a world citizen, since there is no world state" would have been seen by this tradition as a cowardly way of avoiding thinking about how high a price one will pay to help others who are in need. For one can always find ways to help, if one thinks as a member of that virtual commonwealth, which Kant called "the kingdom of ends." To quote John Rawls again, "Purity of heart, if one could attain it, would be to see clearly and to act with grace and self-command from that point of view."

In our own world, moreover, there are many practical opportunities for world citizenship that were simply not available to the Stoics, or even to Kant and his contemporaries. As Richard Falk points out, nongovernmental organizations of many kinds are mobilizing to influence government action on issues ranging from ecology to domestic violence; one may support or join such organizations. Through such groups one may pressure national governments to take action toward certain global aims. The deliberations of governments, moreover, are becoming ever more intertwined and international: the population conference in Cairo and the women's meeting in Beijing are just two examples in which governments recognized the existence of problems that cross national lines. The information revolution is rapidly multiplying the possibilities for action as a world citizen. My morning newspaper today brings information about the deaths of thousands of (mainly female) orphans in China from malnutrition. The very existence of such news opens possibilities of action for the world citizen, possibilities ranging from financial support for Human Rights Watch to thinking and writing to (where it is open to individuals) more direct participation in deliberations about the welfare of children and women. One can do all these things, and the fact that there is no world state is no excuse for not doing them. Increasingly, too, we are all going to have to do some tough thinking about the luck of birth and the morality of transfers of wealth from richer to poorer nations. The fact that the nation-state is the fundamental political unit does not prevent one from discovering to what an astonishing degree the luck of being born in a particular country influences life chances. To take just a single example, life expectancy at birth ranges from 78.6 years in Hong Kong and 78.2 years in Iceland and Sweden to 39.0 years in Sierra Leone. This is not just, and we had better think about it. Not just think, do.

The absence of a world state does not thwart cosmopolitan conduct, then, for those who are genuinely committed to it. But cosmopolitanism does not require, in any case, that we should give equal attention to all parts of the world. None of the major thinkers in the cosmopolitan tradition denied that we can and should give special attention to our own families and to our own ties of religious and national belonging. In obvious ways, we must do so, since the nation-state sets up the basic terms for most of our daily conduct, and since we are all born into a family of some sort. Cosmopolitans hold, moreover, that it is right to give the local an additional measure of concern. But the primary reason a cosmopolitan should have for this is not that the local is better per se, but rather
that this is the only sensible way to do good. Appiah's moving account of his father's career makes this point wonderfully. Had Joe Appiah tried to do a little good for all the people of the world, he would have contributed far less to the world than he did by his intense commitment to Ghana. The same holds true of parenthood: if I tried to help all the world's children a little bit, rather than to devote an immense amount of love and care to Rachel Nussbaum, I would be no good at all as a parent (as Dickens's portrait of Mrs. Jellyby mordantly showed). But that should not mean that we believe our own country or family is really worth more than the children or families of other people—all are still equally human, of equal moral worth.

A useful analogy is one's own native language. I love the English language. And although I have some knowledge of some other languages, whatever I express of myself in the world I express in English. If I were to try to equalize my command of even five or six languages, and to do a little writing in each, I would write poorly. But this doesn't mean that I think English is intrinsically superior to other languages. I recognize that all human beings have an innate linguistic capacity, and that any person might have learned any language; which language one learns is in that sense morally irrelevant, an accident of birth that does not determine one's worth. That recognition of equal worth has practical consequences for the ways in which I react to and speak about others. Similarly, in the moral case, I may focus disproportionately on the local. But my recognition of equal humanity does supply constraints on my conduct toward others. What are these constraints? May I give my daughter an expensive college education, while children all over the world are starving and effective relief agencies exist? May Americans enjoy their currently high standard of living, when there are reasons to think the globe as a whole could not sustain that level of consumption? These are hard questions, and there will and should be much debate about the proper answers. My point is that we must ask the questions, and we must know enough and imagine enough to give sensible answers.

As we pose these questions, we should value human diversity. As Appiah says, the cosmopolitan ideal includes a positive delight in the diversity of human cultures, languages, and forms of life. This pluralism prompts cosmopolitan liberals to insist on what is called "the priority of the right to the good," that is, on giving first priority to structures—prominently including structures of equal liberty—that will protect the ability of people to choose a form of life in accordance with their own lights, whether cultural or religious or personal. The very principles of a world citizenship in this way value the diversity of persons; they value it so much that they make liberty of choice the benchmark of any just constitutional order, and refuse to compromise this principle in favor of any particular tradition or religion. McConnell and I differ deeply on the issue of public funding for religious education. We do not differ, however, about the profound importance of religion, and respect for religious difference, in a just society. Our difference concerns the right way for a liberal regime to value diversity. In my view, valuing diversity entails strong support for a shared public culture that makes the right prior to the good. I believe that this goal would be subverted by public funding of religious schools, and I therefore oppose such funding. In his view, valuing diversity entails giving parents the chance to use public funds to choose a religious education for their children; to give the public schools an advantage is not fair to those who prefer religious schools. But these are differences within a larger agreement about the importance of strong protections for religious liberty. Of course, in saying this I am doing what Putnam rightly advises, valuing what is best in U.S. constitutional traditions, as well as what is best in the
traditions of India and, no doubt, many other places; in general, a world citizen will always try to find the seeds of the commendable universal in the local, but he or she also will be prepared to discover that some of them are missing.

The crucial question for a world citizen is how to promote diversity without hierarchy. Liberals are committed to diversity, but also to equality: They view equality as a constraint on the forms of diversity that may reasonably be fostered. Some forms of difference have historically been inseparable from hierarchical ordering: for example, racial differences in America, gender differences almost everywhere, differences of dialect or of literary and musical taste in many parts of the world. Some forms of diversity are clearly separable from hierarchy: most religious and ethnic differences, and many cultural differences. The challenge of world citizenship, it seems to me, is to work toward a state of things in which all of the differences will be nonhierarchically understood. We have no way of knowing what some of them will look like under true equality. Were gender differences to become more like the differences among ethnic groups in America or the differences between basketball fans and lovers of jazz, what would be left of them? We simply do not yet know. But that is the ideal to which the world citizen aspires. It is, of course, much better to be in a world that has both Dennis Rodman and Wynton Marsalis than in a world that has only one or the other. Both are great, and no doubt they would be less uniquely great were they more similar. We should value diversity in that way. But we should not value that part of it that is defined in terms of dominance and subordination. (This does not mean that the world citizen cannot believe that the Bulls are better than all other teams. World citizens never deny what is self-evidently true.)

World citizenship, then, places exacting demands on the imaginations of each of us. To be sure, the imagination is not enough. As Adam Smith noted, compassion for others is a fragile and inconstant device. If we left our world citizenship to the vagaries of our own daily reflections, we would act less well than if we were to institutionalize our best ideas. I agree with Elaine Scarry, therefore, that the imagination needs laws—especially constitutional arrangements—that do as much as possible to institutionalize the equal worth of persons. But these laws must take their impetus from the imagination, and they will prove unstable to the extent that people become obuse. We must, therefore, cultivate world citizenship in our hearts and minds as well as our codes of law. I agree with Scarry, for the reasons she gave and a few others, that works of imaginative literature play a pivotal role in that cultivation.

We have many ways of avoiding the claim of common humanity. One way, I think, is to say that the universal is boring and could not be expected to claim our love. I am astonished that so many distinguished writers should make this suggestion, connecting the idea of world citizenship with a "black-and-white" world, a world lacking in poetry. The world of the cosmopolitan can seem boring—to those hooked on the romantic symbols of local belonging. But many fine things can seem boring to those not brought up to appreciate them. What my critics charge, however, is that it is right to find the love of humanity boring, that powerful art cannot be made about it, that it is bloodless and characterless somewhat the way fast food is characterless. It seems to me, by contrast, that it would be difficult to find a powerful work of art that is not, at some level, concerned with the claim of the common and our tragic and comic refusals of that claim.

Ancient Athenian tragedy was not about a peculiarly Greek ethnicity—though of course, it derived from indigenous literary and musical traditions and could best be understood by people steeped in those traditions. It dramatized its aspiration to recognition of humanity by situating itself in mythic times, or on the Trojan side of the Trojan War—or on a desert island, home to an outcast whose
foot oozes pus, whom all good Greeks shun with a properly Greek
disgust. Shakespeare's deviously fictive places ("a seacoast in Bo­
hemian") indicate a similar desire to lure the imagination away from
its most complacent moorings in the local, causing it to venture
outward to some strange land, be it medieval Denmark or ancient
Rome, where human beings, not without poetry and not without
passion, attempt to love one another, often tragically. Even the
most apparently local of literary landscapes—say, Joyce's Dublin or
Walt Whitman's America—are landscapes of the imagination in
which the human body and its zestful surprising irregularities have
a more than local home. Consider, too, how much not-black-and­
white poetry and prose concerns, in fact, the situation of the exile
and outsider—Philoctetes, Hamlet, Leopold Bloom, Molly
Bloom—people who, by virtue of their outsider status, can tell
truths about the political community, its justice and injustice, its
embracings and its failures to embrace. In engaging with such
works—and indeed with any works that depict a world of human
beings beyond the narrow one we know—in permitting these
strangers to inhabit our minds and our hearts, we are enacting the
love of humanity. This does not seem boring.

In Walter Scott's famous poem, on which I was raised, the non­
patriot is a man "with soul so dead" that he never could be the
subject of "minstrel raptures." The poem suggests that all true
poetry is patriotic in inspiration and in theme. Several of my crit­
cics would appear to be followers of Scott, and I am cast as that person
whose empty humanism is destined to go to its grave "unwept,
unhonored, and unsung." I suggest, instead, that large-souled and
compelling art is generally concerned with the recognition of the
common in the strange and the strange in the common—and that
narrowly patriotic art, by contrast, is frequently little more than
kitsch, idolatry. Scott's poem is kitsch. Much of Rudyard Kipling's
poetry is kitsch. Most of the products of most poet laureates in
office are kitsch. What tragic drama could there be if one exalts
one's own people above others, refusing the moral claim of a com­
mon humanity, with its common needs, failures, fears, and refus­
als? What lyric poetry of any depth? Tagore's point in The Home
and the World was that Sandip only seemed more interesting. As
both a sexual being and a rhetorical artist, he was utterly banal.

This of course does not require us to deny that all profound hu­
man matters are differently realized in different societies, or that
the full understanding of any artwork involves, therefore, engage­
ment with history, society, and the specificities of a local way of
life, as well as knowledge of a literary tradition. Nor does it require
denying that even the inner world of emotion, desire, and thought
is differently realized in different societies, or that any real-life hu­
man being is some concrete instantiation of some specific set of hu­
man potentialities. But that we can recognize one another across
these divisions—that we can even form the project of investigating
them—is also true, and fundamental. Dante was a poet of his time,
and we cannot read him well without learning a great deal about
his time. But if he were only a poet of his time, Pinsky would not
be producing his magnificent poem translating him, nor would any
of us care to read his works. In such generous engagements with a
stranger, we enact a duty of the moral imagination that we all too
frequently shun in real life. We never do meet a bare abstract "hu­
man being." But we meet the common in the concrete, as well as
the concrete in the common.

moral development that makes a mystery out of familiar experi­
ences of commonality. It goes like this: When a child is little, it rec­
ognizes and loves only its own particular parents; then, after a
while, it comes to know and love its other relatives, then its region
or local group, then its nation—and finally, if at all, we get to hu­
maturity on the outside. But we come to the larger only through the smaller, and it is the moral emotions connected with the smaller that can be expected to have the most force.

Consider an alternative account. At birth, all an infant is is a human being. Its needs are the universal needs for food and comfort and light. Infants respond, innately, to the sight of a human face. A smile from a human being elicits a reactive smile, and there is reason to think this an innate capacity of recognition. At the same time, in the first few months of life an infant is also getting close experience of one or more particular people, whom it soon learns to tell apart from others, roughly at the time that it is also learning to demarcate itself from them. These people have a culture, so all the child's interactions with them are mediated by cultural specificity; but they are also mediated by needs that are in some form common, and that form the basis for later recognition of the common.

At some point, the child understands that these givers of food and comfort are also separate people, people who can go and come at will. She is learning something about her parents' particularity, but at the same time discovering a common feature of human life: that bodies are separate from other bodies, wills from other wills. This discovery leads, it would seem, to fear and anger—experiences that are always concretely shaped, but which also display much crosscultural commonality. The extreme physical helplessness of the human infant, combined with its early cognitive maturity, give human infancy a specific life course that creates a poignant combination of deep need with the awareness of the un goverability of the sources of need—making the ambivalence of love a likely part of all human concern. A plausible view about the origin of moral thinking is that it is, at least in part, an effort to atone for and regulate the painful ambivalence of one's love, the evil wishes one has directed toward the giver of care. In atonement for having made the overweening demand to be the center of the world, the young child agrees to limit and regulate her demands by the needs of others. Again, this learning will be concretely shaped in each different society—but the powerful motivations of a child to overcome hatred of loved ones derive from features of a common humanity. They also take the child back to that humanity, by asking her to consider herself as one person among others, not the entire world. Although this learning is about a specific mother or father, its content carries the heart to humanity.

As the child grows older and begins to hear and tell stories, she investigates further the shape of the shared form of human life. Most children's stories do not bind the mind to the local. Good fairy tales are rarely about Cambridge, Massachusetts. They inspire wonder and curiosity by exploring the contours of things both strange and surprisingly familiar. They ask children to concern themselves with the insides of animals and trees, as well as humans of many places and times. While inhabiting a particular local world, they are already learning about a far larger world. Children frequently have more intense moral concern for animals than for the adults around them. And anyone who has traveled with a child in a place of great poverty will know that the impulse of sympathy is simple and powerful in the child, devious and imperfect in oneself. The imaginations of children are flexible and subtle instruments of acknowledgment, carrying them to the distant in the local and the familiar in the distant. All circles develop simultaneously, in a complex and interlacing movement. But surely the outer circle is not the last to form. Long before children have any acquaintance with the idea of nation, or even of one specific religion, they know hunger and loneliness. Long before they encounter patriotism, they have probably encountered death. Long before ideology interferes, they know something of humanity.

This brings me back to the avenue of trees. These people were able to function as world citizens because they had not permitted the original awareness of common needs and vulnerabilities to be
eclipsed by the local. I imagine them retaining from childhood a sense of the human face, and also of their own needy hungry humanity. I imagine them retaining a vivid determination that ill wishes would not triumph over good, that their desire to subordinate their parents to their own needs would not triumph over the claims of the separate other. Because they had not allowed themselves to become encrusted over by the demands of local ideology, they were able to respond to a human face and form. In that sense, it seems to me most just to represent them as young green trees, bearers of a certain freshness, a living human thought—the thoughts of adult children, rather than of the shriveled adults we often, all too tragically, become.

Notes

Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism

1. See Hackney’s speech to the National Press Club, which was circulated to all participants in the planning meeting.

2. This is an important qualification. A short essay of mine on international issues was eventually included in the Scholar’s Pamphlet issued by the project: “A National Conversation on American Pluralism and Identity: Scholar’s Essays,” MacArthur Foundation.

3. A recent example of this argument is in Amy Gutmann’s “Multiculturalism and Democratic Education,” presented at a conference on “Equality and Its Critics” held at Brown University in March 1994. My article originated as a comment on Gutmann’s paper. For Gutmann’s reply, see “Democratic Citizenship,” this volume, pp. 66–69.

4. For some related questions about women and work, see the articles in Martha C. Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, eds., Women, Culture, and Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

5. I am grateful to Brad Inwood for permission to use his unpublished translation of this section.

6. I exempt Hipparchia from criticism, since she was clearly trying to show him up and she did not endorse the fallacious inference seriously.
Amartya Sen, Humanity and Citizenship


Martha C. Nussbaum, Reply

4. Himmelfarb (or rather, her history professor) seems wrong in asserting that “the Enlightenment itself had given birth to an aggressive nationalism.” The fact that some people living at the time of the Enlightenment were aggressive nationalists hardly makes it right to blame their conduct on thinkers who energetically denounced such projects.
7. See *Human Development Report* 1995 (New York: United Nations Development Program, 1995), p. 155. For those interested in the local, the figure for the United States is 76.0, lower than all other countries in the top fifteen in the general ranking, with the exception of Finland, at 75.7, and Germany, at 76.0.
8. On the tradition of religious toleration in India, see Amartya Sen, “Is Coercion a Part of Asian Values?” (forthcoming). Sen establishes that the Indian tradition of toleration is as old as the comparable “Western tradition.”
9. Marcus Aurelius did say that Stoicism required one not to be a partisan of the Green or Blue teams at the games—but he was speaking of a Roman context in which such rivalries gave rise to delight in the murder of human beings.
12. I am surprised that none of my critics have asked why I focus on the moral claim of the human species, and they appear to neglect the claims of other forms of life. From this direction one could imagine a serious challenge to my position, one that I have not yet answered.